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The State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA)1 confers
considerable powers on New York State municipalities. In fact,
most municipalities are probably unaware of the full scope of
authority they are given by this statute.
Powers
SEQRA's most important mandate is the preparation of
environmental impact statements (EISs) for the discretionary
actions of state or local agencies that may have a significant effect
on the environment. One of the first steps in the SEQRA process is
the designation of a "lead agency," which must be one of the
agencies that has approval power over the project. Once designated,
the lead agency has almost total control over the SEQRA process.
The lead agency determines:
* whether an EIS is needed;
* the scope of the EIS;
* whether a draft EIS (typically prepared by the applicant's
consultants) is
acceptable.
* whether and when to have public hearings;
* how comments from the public should be responded to; and
* the contents of the final EIS.
Every EIS must consider alternatives to the proposed action. One
important element in determining the scope of an EIS is which
alternatives should be considered. The lead agency has a free rein
in requiring consideration of projects of a different size, design or
purpose than that envisioned by the applicant.
Once the final EIS is complete, the lead agency and every other
involved agency must make their own decisions about whether,
and upon what terms, to approve the project. Each agency's
decisions must be accompanied by a findings statement. As the
statute provides:
When an agency decides to carry out or approve an action
which has been the subject of an environmental impact
statement, it shall make an explicit finding that the
requirements of the section have been met and that
consistent with social, economic and other essential

considerations, to the maximum extent practicable,
adverse environmental effects revealed in the
environmental impact statement process will be
minimized or avoided.2
This provision empowers agencies to impose conditions on
applicants or, in many instances, to deny applications. The
leading case interpreting these powers is Town of Henrietta v. New
York State Department of Environmental Conservation,3 in which
the court upheld DEC's decision to require a shopping center
developer to institute energy conservation and wetlands protection
measures as a condition of receiving a water pollution permit.
DEC's regulations under SEQRA codify this requirement.
SEQR does not change the existing jurisdiction of
agencies nor the jurisdiction between or among state and
local agencies. SEQR provides all involved agencies with
the authority, following the filing of a final EIS and
written findings statement, or pursuant to subdivision
617.7(d) of this Part [concerning conditioned negative
declarations] to impose substantive conditions upon an
action to ensure that the requirements of this Part have
been satisfied. The conditions imposed must be
practicable and reasonably related to impacts identified
in the EIS or the conditioned negative declaration.4
This authority to impose conditions is clear for agencies that have
broad jurisdiction, such as town boards and planning boards. The
state zoning enabling laws also empower such bodies to impose
conditions on the issuance of site plan approvals,5special
permits,6 and variances.7 It is less clear, as a matter of law,
whether a special- purpose entity (such as a wetlands commission)
has the authority to impose conditions unrelated to its special
purpose.
The authority under SEQRA to impose conditions is a sword that is
much more readily wielded by agencies than against them. Courts
have upheld agency decisions (challenged by developers) to impose
conditions on developers;8few cases have overruled agency
decisions (challenged by environmental and citizen groups) notto
impose conditions.9
Thus SEQRA leaves agencies with the discretion whether to give
precedence to environmental or economic considerations. Provided
that other binding standards are not violated, an agency may
approve a project that will be environmentally destructive, if the
agency has followed all necessary procedures and made a formal
finding as to the reasons for its decision. Similarly, the agency
may also disapprove such a project and find that the economic
benefits do not warrant the environmental destruction.
This broad discretion reflects the legislative compromise reached

in 1975 when SEQRA was enacted. Environmentalists wanted
SEQRA to mandate pro-environmental outcomes; buildings and
labor unions were opposed to any statute at all. The State
Legislature chose a middle ground under which agencies could,
but were not compelled to, choose the environment over the
economy where the two were in conflict.
Thus a broad range of decisions will survive judicial challenge.
Agencies may do a great deal under SEQRA; they must follow the
required procedures, but having done that they have few
constraints in the decisions they make.
Constraints
There are two principal constraints on agency discretion under
SEQRA: a set of paperwork requirements called the "HOMES Test,"
and the takings doctrine.
HOMES Test- This test, named after the decision in H.O.M.E.S. v.
New York State Urban Development Corp.,10is the principal way
that courts determine that agencies have followed SEQRA and not
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in their decision- making. This
test involves three questions:
I. Did the agency identify the relevant areas of environmental
concern? II. Did the agency take a `hard look' at those areas?
III. Did the agency make a `reasoned elaboration' of the basis for its
determination?
Where courts have struck down agency actions under SEQRA, it
has most often been because the agencies flunked the HOMES Test
by failing to document their decision-making process. Good
intentions will not suffice if the paper record is inadequate.
Once it has been approved by the lead agency, the final EIS
becomes the authoritative statement of the project's impacts. If an
impact is not acknowledged in the final EIS, an agency will have
great difficulty disapproving or conditioning a project because of
that impact. A frequent problem has arisen when agencies have
uncritically accepted a developer's EIS, and then attempted to act
in a way inconsistent with that approved EIS.11It is essential for
the lead agency to revise the EIS so that it accurately portrays
current conditions and anticipated impacts before it becomes a
final approved document. The SEQRA regulations provide that a
lead agency may charge the applicant for the costs of hiring the
agency's own consultants to review, or even prepare, the EIS.12
A municipality may not, however, simply sit on an application
and refuse to process it. A developer may not be entitled to any
particular decision, but he or she is entitled to some decision. An
unjustified delay in processing the application may lead to a
ruling that the application should be deemed granted.13
It is common for municipalities to wish to prevent

environmentally destructive projects from being built in their
borders. It is almost as common for municipalities to flounder
about and, by failing to follow the necessary procedures, lose their
opportunity to stop these projects. Several 1996 cases illustrate how
various towns have approached this process correctly and
incorrectly.
In three decisions, municipalities got it right -- or right enough.
They became the lead agencies; required the preparation of EISs;
ensured that these EISs fully disclosed the projects' adverse
environmental impacts; and, after the completion of the FEISs,
exercised their power to disapprove the projects, citing specific
provisions of the FEISs. Despite finding some minor procedural
irregularities, the courts upheld all three of these disapprovals.14
In four other decisions, however, municipalities made such
serious errors that they lost their chances to stop undertakings
they opposed. In two of these, municipalities seemed to sit
passively while DEC considered and approved applications for
these projects; by the time the towns work up, their chance to
participate meaningfully in the SEQRA process had passed them
by.15In a third, the town issued a negative declaration for a
project, but then disapproved the project; the court annulled this
disapproval, noting the logical inconsistency between declaring a
project would not hurt the environment, and disapproving the
project on environmental grounds.16In the fourth, the town
declared itself lead agency, but never decided whether to issue a
negative or a positive declaration; instead, without obtaining more
information, it simply
denied the application. This, the court unsurprisingly found, was
arbitrary and capricious.17
Takings-- The Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution prevents the
federal, state and local governments from taking private property
without just compensation. The law of takings is in considerable
flux, but there are two basic circumstances when a court will find
a taking to have occurred:
A. the government action denies the owner any economically
viable use of property (not just the most profitable use); or
B. the action does not substantially advance a legitimate
governmental interest.
A series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions have established that a
taking occurs if there is not a close enough nexus between the land
use restriction and the goal it seeks to achieve,18or if there is not at
least a "rough proportionality" between the restriction and the
goal.19 A rule of general applicability (such as a change in the
municipal-wide zoning code) has a considerably easier time in
court than a site-specific restriction.
An example of where a municipality failed to act properly, and had
to pay dearly as a result, was Town of Orangetown v. Magee.20 A

town sued a developer to force it to remove a temporary building,
the building permit for which had been revoked by the building
inspector. The developer counterclaimed and convinced the court
that the permit revocation had been ordered by the town supervisor
for political reasons, without a sound factual basis. The town was
required to pay the developer $5.1 million.
The New York Court of Appeals on February 18, 1997 issued four
decisions that clarified the application of takings law in New York
State. These decisions considerably strengthen the hand of
municipalities in regulating land use.21 Together, these decisions
establish:
* There is no taking if a rationally-based land use restriction very
substantially reduces the value of the property but still leaves
some residual economic value.
* If a land use restriction is imposed, and the property is
subsequently sold, the new owner has acquired land that is
burdened by the land use restriction, and cannot claim a taking
regardless of how onerous is the burden.
In one of these decisions (Gazza), the plaintiff bought his land for
$100,000, and said that after development it would be worth
$396,000. A wetlands restriction reduced the property's value to
$80,000, and a neighbor had offered $50,000 for it. The Court of
Appeals found that enough value remained in the property to
defeat a takings claim.
Trends
Over the past decade or so, the trend in the law has been to increase
the discretion vested with municipalities over use of land,
provided that the municipalities adequately articulate the reasons
for their decisions.
Though the courts still say they require "strict compliance" with
SEQRA, in fact many of them now forgive minor procedural
irregularities.22 The courts are very slow to second-guess a
substantive land use or environmental decision made by a
municipality, provided that the decision could find adequate
support in the record; in fact, environmentalists challenging such
actions have not won a SEQRA case in the New York Court of
Appeals since 1989.
The recent suite of Court of Appeals decisions on the takings
doctrine make it clear that very few land use restrictions will be
found to be takings requiring compensation. A 1992 statute
penalizes developers and others who bring "SLAPP Suits"
("Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation"),24 and since
then no such suits in New York State seem to have succeeded.
Thus municipalities that properly document their decisions now
have very broad discretion to protect their environment.
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